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Introduction
I
T is popUlarly believed that the requirement in Irish elections that
candidates’ names be printed in alphabetical order on the ballot paper
results in a bias against those whose surnames begin with the later letters
of the alphabet. One journalist recently went so far as to assert that "the
spelling of a candidate’s name has in many cases been almost as important as
his politics in ensuring success at the polls;’? On the other hand, the im-
portance and even the existence of such a bias has been questioned. The issue
was debated at some length in D~iil t~ireann in connection’ with the Electoral
Bill, 1962
, 
when an Amendment to randomise the ballot paper was withdrawn
after a discussion in the course of which little empirical evidence was ad-
vanced.~ One authority on electoral systems concluded that "in the Irish
constituencies the initial letter of a candidate’s name has . . . only a trifling
effect on his chance of election".3 It is also notable that political analysts
very rarely mention alphabetical bias in any detailed discussion of an election.
The purpose of the present study is to assess whether an important alphabetical
bias can be shown to exist and, if so, to explore the exact mechanisms by which
it operates.
To establish whether or not an alphabetical distortion is present ~n the
distribution of D(dl Deputies’ (or T.D.s’) names, it is necessary to ascertain
the distribution of names in the Irish population as a whole. We have used as
our benchmark the alphabetical distribution of 2,IOO names obtained as a
national random sample from the electoral registers.4 Using the percentage
distribution of these names between five groupings of the letters of the alphabet
(with approximately one fifth of all names in each group), we have studied the
distribution of the surnames of both the candidates and the T.D.s elected in
the February 1973 General Election. The results are set out in Table I.
This table shows that major discrepancies exist between the alphabetical
V’Getting Elected is as Simple as ABC", Sunday Independent, 4 March I973.
~See D~il ]~ireann, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 00% No. 3 (27 February i963)
, 
Cols. 492-516,
and Vol. 2oi, No. 6 (2 April, x963)
, 
Cols. 815-82I. The issue is not discussed in the Reports of the
Joint Committee on Electoral Law, Dublin: The Stationery Office, x962 (Pr. 6363).
3Enid Lakeman, How Democracies Vote: A Study of Majority and Probortional Electoral Systems, London:
Faber and Faber, I97O
, 
p. i49. It should be noted, however, that the author was comparing the
Irish system with the block voting system in London Borough Council Elections.
4These names were kindly supplied to us by the Survey Unit of the Economic and Social Research
Institute. It is interesting to note that the alphabetical distribution of these names corresponded to
within o.5 per cent in each category to a simple estimate based on the personal names in the 1973
Telephone Directory.
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TABLE 1 " Al~habet~al distribution of candida~s" and T.O.s’ surnames.
General E~ction, x973 (percentages)
First letter of surname
Total no.
,H-L M-O i’P’-,~< (-- lOO
,,. per cent)
.r7"~ ~5:3 .... 19’4 if,’100Random sample’ofl¢ishpd~ulation 2o"3 : ! 7"9’
All candidates ~ 27’I, I8.8.
T.D.s elected 32.6 22.2
Incur/ibent~’candidates "~ 33.6: " rio.9
Non-incumbent. candidates, ......
members of one of:the three,
major parties 24.9
17"6 22"5;~;. !4’o 335:*
16.o 15.3 13:9 I44"16.4 I7,2 11.9 134"
17"8    18"5 23.6 !5"3 I57
Non-incumbent candidates,
.not members of a major
party : -, 15.9
Fianna F~il candidates 29:4 1
Fianna Film T.D.s Elected "’ 31.9
Fine Gael candidates ¯ 28;8
Firm Gael T;D.sElected 35"2
Labour Party candidates ..... 26..8
Labour Patty T.D.s Elected 26.3
Independent and’ other -:
candidates 18"4
Independent and other T.D.s i (5o.o)
15"9
19/3
23"2
21.6’
25"9"
’I8"9. 34.1
2I"9 2I’O
17"4 ,17"4
15"3- 19.8
~4"8, 13’o
14.3 ....."I 4’,323’R
10"5 i I5"8 ,’I5"8
16.3    16.3 30.6
I5"9 ~ 44
8"4 : I!. 9",,
I0"I. - . 69*
’i4"4’ " IiI "
I I ".I’ 54
21.4 ;.,..5
6
3176 !9
I8"4 ’ ’49(50,0) 2,
*Includes outgoing Ceann Comhairle (Speaker).
distribution of Irish names in general, on the one hand; and0f candidates’ ’and
T.D.s’ names on the other. Candidates and; to an even greater degree, T.D.s
are far moreiikely to have names starting with the letters A, B, and C than the
population in general. Similarly, names starting with M, N or O are relatively
much less frequent among the politicians than among the population. There is
an increasing distortion evident as one moves from candidates to T.D.s; thus,
whilst only 20 per cent of the population have names beginning with A, B or
C, 27 per cent of the’candidates and 33 per cent of the T.DLs elected have
such names. Similarly, 25 per c¯ent of population have names in the M/N, 0
category, bnt 0nly 23 per cent of thecandidatesand 15 per cent of the T.D.s.
In terms of D~til seats, there are: i8 more T.D.s in the A-C category ands6 more
in the D-G category¯ than one might expect, and corresp0ndingly:fewer in the
other categories.
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It is evident from Table I that incumbents candidates were distributed
very similarly to T.D.s, but that non-incumbents were closet to the Irish
population. Non-incumbents who were members of one of the three major
political parties occupied an intermediate position, showing sor//e tendency
towards the same alphabetical bias evident among incumbents, but to a much
smaller degree. Thus, 32 per cent of incumbents who were party members had
names starting with A, B, or C compared with 25 per cent of non-incumbents
who were party members, and only 16 per cent of non-incumbents who were
not party members.
We have used chi-squared tests to test the hypothesis that the alphabetical
distributions of candidates’ and deputies’ names are consistent with random
sampling from the Irish population. Following are the results oF testing the
relevant hypotheses:
Null Hypothesis: That the group is alphabetically a random sample of the
Irish population:
Group .: ~ Chi-squared
All candidates 14. I**
Incumbent candidates i9.7"*
Non-incumbent candidates (total) " 0.5
Nor/-incumbent candidates who were members of a major party 3"3
Fianna F~.i!, candidates , i4.8"*
Fine GaeI candidates 7’7t
Labour Party candidates 2"0
Independent and minor party candidates o’7
T.D.s elected (total) , 20.4**
Null Hypothesis: That the T.D.s elected are alphabetically a random sample of the
relevant set of candidates:
Group    ~
T.D.s elected (total)
Non-incumbents elected
Incumbents not re-elected
**Significant, 99 per cent confidence level.
Chi-squaced
5"4
4.8
0’4
"~Significant, 9° per cent confidence level.
SWe use this term, for convenience, to refer to "sitting" or "outgoing" T.D.s. It does not include
the two cases (R. Burke, Dublin North County, and J. G. Esmond, Wexford) where the candidate
was a close relative of the outgoing deputy.
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.The highly, significant values obtained for all candidates~ and~ incumbent
candidates in the first,ha!f of~this table,confirm the validity’of:the impressions
conveyed by Tab!e, I. It is interesting to note, that,non,incumbent candidates,
both members of major parties and others, did n0t’differ significantly:fin
alphabetical, distribution from the general population. AmOng the major parties,~
Fianna F~dl:and Fine Gael showed a verysimilar distortion in,the alphabetical
distribution of their candidates (although there were~markedly;fewer Fianna
F~iil candidates,.in, the PyZ group),~ but Labour Party, minor: party and,
Independent candidates were much more randomly distributed. This contrast is
partially due to the much higher proportion¯ of incumbents among¯ Fianna F~iil
candidates (55 :per. cent,: compared .with 42 per cent of Fine Gael,,,29 per:cefit.
of Labour candidates,, and:Io per Cent of other candidates)5(partially to the
fact that the Labour Party ran one candidate only in 2 i: constituencies, and
partially to the varying importance in the different parties of the voting
patterns discussed later in this paper. :,
If non-incumbent candidates who¯ were members of a major party are
comPared with independent and minor party candidates, it may be seen that
their alphabetical distributions are similar, This may mean that the parties
are not influenced by alphabetical Considerations in their choice Of new can-didates, though it is ,equally possible that a tendency to choose, high-ranking
candidates is offset by an opposite tendency on the part ofpowerfu! incumbents
to try to ensure that newcomers on the ballot do not rank higher than them-
selves.                                          "
The tests of the hypothesis th~/t the T.D.s elected are a randomsample of the
candidates are less conclusive. In the case of incumbent .T.D.s who were not
re-elected, it is clear that no alphabetical bias is evident. Among non-
incumbents Who were elected~ there is evidence of bias,, although the chi-
squared test is significant at only a low confidence level (P (X~) =’3o). Whilst
in any one election the relevant null hypothesis is that those elected: are a
random sample of the candidates who ran in that election, it is arguable that if
all elections hadbeen uninfluenced by alphabetical factorsilthCT.D.s~’elected
should be a random sample of the population. It is evident from the chi’squared
value of 20"4 that this null hypothesis cannot be maintained. It is obvious ,that
the impact o(alphabetical factors in the election of T.D.s has been cumulative;
and far greater than the evidence from a single election will show.         ¯
As a summary of the effect of alphabetical factors in the"!973 electi0n results,
the disparity between the actual and the expected distribution of~ non-
incumbents elected may be considered: ~    :
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Distribution of surnames of non-
incumbents who were elected:
Actual
Expected on the basis of the
alphabetical distribution of non-
incumbent candidate.s, members
Of a major party
Expect£d oll the basis of the
alphabetical distribution of the
Irish population
A-C D-G H-L NI-O P-Z Total
8 7      4 3 6     28
7"0 5"0    5"2    6.6
5"6 5"0    4"8     7~I
4"3 28 ,
5"4 28
The candidates elected are more heavily concentrated in ’the A-G group than
expected on the basis of the alphabetical distribution either of all Irish names
or of non-incumbent candidates who belonged to a major party.6 The under-
representation of H-O names among the elected is very striking. These figures
illustrate the operation of the alphabetical bias in the election of new members:"
to the 1973 D~dl, and the composition of this D~il reflects the cumulative impact
of this bias in successive elections.
SAll the non-incumbents elected in this Election belonged to a major party.
Historical Background
T is of interest to trace the chronology of the alphabetical bias in the names
of D~iil members. Our research on this aspect of the subject fias not been
intensive, but we believe the data of Table 2 are Suggestive. ’Itmay l~e seen
that the extent of the bias has increased since the foundation of the State
, 
at
least until x966.v The DCdl of I922 Was notable for the over-representation of
M, N, O names and all successive D~da have¯ seen a remarkable~ shrinking of
the proportion-in this category. Parallel with¯this development, there has been
a growing concentration of names in the A-G groups, ,but this tendency has,
slowed down since’ 196I. It is natural to speculate whether the Slight decline
inthe bias of T.D.s names since x965 can be attributed to the Electoral (Amend-
ment) Act of 1963, .-which introduced the parties’ names on the ballot paper.,
It certainly seems plausible that before this change.the:effect, of alphabetical
factors on voting patterns would have been greater than it is today, and
possibly operated less through ranking of candidates within a party, and more
through the influence of overall position on the ballot. Another possible
influence is the decreasing number of constituencies in which parties run
three or more candidates. The temporary interruption of past trends in 1948
is noticeable. Detailed research on voting patterns in previous elections is
necessary if further conclusions are to be drawn from the data of Table 2.
In 1922 D~iil members were essentially the candidates who had been
successful in the 19 i 8 Election, which was held under the straight voting system,
and Table 2 shows that their names were not significantly different from the
population as a whole. The progressive increase in the bias in T.D.s’ names
since the Second D~il points to the role of the Proportional Representation
system of voting in producing this result. It must be stressed, however, that
this bias does not follow simply from the existence Of Proportional Representa-
tion: it is the operation of Proportional Representation through ballot papers
that are arranged alphabetically that results in distortion.
~We are assuming that no significant change has occurred since 19~2 in the alphabetical
of names in the population’of the 26 counties. , ~ ’ , , ~, ’ ,’
i6
distribution
TABLE 2 : Alphabetical distribution of T.D.s’ names in selected D dla since 1922 (percentages)
D dil and year
(Sample of Irish Population, 197I)
Second Dgdl, 1922b
Seventh D~il, 1932
Eleventh D~iil, i943
Thirteenth D~il, i948
Fifteenth D~iI, 1954
Sixteenth D~il, 1957
Seventeenth D~il, z96i
Eighteenth D~il, 1965
Nineteenth DAil, 1969
Twentieth D~iil, 1973
First letter of surnames No. of
T.D.s
A-C D-G H-L M-O P-Z
(20"3)    (17"9)    (17"2)    (25"3)    (I9"4)
22-6 17.7 13.7 33.1 12"9
27-3 i8-o 14.7 26-7 i3.3
32"1 16-8 15.3 21-2 14-6
29"3 16"3 15"6 23"I 15"6
29"9 2o’4 15"o 23"8 lO’9
32.0 19.o 15.6 c,i-i 12-’:’
34"7 20-8 i3.9 20-8 9"7
33"3 22 .e 18" I 18" I 8-3
34"7 20-8 17.4 I6.o I1"1
32.6 22.2 16-o i5.3 13.9
C3
Chi’squareda .~
(:I00 0
per cent)
Q
..
I24 6.8
I5o 7"I
137 I~"4" oI47 7"6
147 13"3"*
147 I5"I**
144 22"3**
I44 25"7"* -a
144 25"5** Q144 20.4** r~
**=significant, 99 per cent confidence level (Null hypothesis: T.D.s a random sample of the population.)
* =significant, 95 per cent confidence level.
Notes: (a) Chl-squared values for test of the hypothesis that the T.D.s were alphabetically a random sample of the I97I population.
(b) The I~4 names for thi~ D~il include all those elected in the 1918 General Election except the four members for Dublin University.
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: First Preference Votes
H AY IN G documented the existence of an alphabetical bias in the distribu-tion of both T.D.s’ and candidates’ names, it is necessary to study the
voting patterns ’that have caused this bias.
Table 3 summarises the alphabetical distribution of first preferencevotes
according to the names of the candidates who received them. It :may be seen
that the candidates in the A-G group obtained far:morethan their proportionate
share of the first :preferefice~ votes: cast, and that those in the M-O group
obtained less’ than their share. This pattern is evident in both Fianna F~iil
and Fine Gae!, but not in the Labour Party. It may be seen’that incumbents
in the A-C group obtained somewhat more than itsproportio~ate share of
first preference votes, but in other groups there was little difference. Among
non-incumbents from the major parties, however
, 
the A-C group gained far
more than its proportion of first preferences, and the M-O group far less.
Among other non-incumbents an ever/greater bias in first preference votes
in favour of the upper and lower end of the alphabet and against those in the
middle is evident. Thus, Table 3 documents the fact that when voters are
choosing between candidates many of whom are not very well known (e.g. non-
incumbents), they: are more:likely-to give first preference votes to those with
names drawn from the first letters of the ali~habet, whilst those with names in
the middle of the alphabet are least likely to’get the first preference vote.s
Our major hypothesis regarding voting behavi0ur is that a significant
proportion of voters decide first:which party to vote for, and then allocate~
their preferences tO the party’s candidates in the order in which they appear
on the ballot paper. According to this hypothesis it is notuncommon for voters
to have strong Preferences between parties but to be undecided between the
candidates put forward by each party. If this is the case it is quite rational to
allow alphabetical factors to decide the allocation of preferences within a
party% (This voting pattern would, however, be modified by the tendency for
incumbents to attract first preference votes regardless of their’rank among
SIndependent and other parties’- candidates resemble the two largest parties in this table, whereas
in Table x they resembled the Labour Party. This apparent contradiction can be readily explained
, by the fact that, Mr Blaney obtained t2"5 per cent of all the first preference votes obtained by "Inde-
pendents and 6ther parties’ candidates". It is also relevant that although some distortion is evident
in the alphabetical distribution of first preference votes among Independents, most candidates in this
category received a Very low vote, and only two were elected.
*The voter may be :encouraged to do thisby the tendency for campaign literature to list the party’s
candidates alphabetically.
..
i8
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TABLE 3 : Distribution of first preference votes received according,.to, alphabetical grouping of
candidates’ surnames. ,General Election, 1973 (percentages)
Random sample of Irish names
All candidates:
Firstpreferences
(Candidates)
Incumbent candidates’:~
First preferences -,
(Candidates)
Non-incumbent candidates,
members of one of the three
major parties:
First preferences
(Candidates)
Non-incumbent candidates,
not members of a major
party:
First preferences
(Candidates)
Fianna F£il candidates:
First preferences
(Candidates)
Fine Gael candidates:
First preferences
(Candidates)
Labour Party candidates:
First preferences
(Candidates)
Independent and other
candidates :
First preferences
(Candidates)
First letter of surname
,’_,.
Total no.
A-C D-G H-L M-O P-Z    (= I oo
per cent),
20.3 x7.9 i7;.~’ 25.3 ~ I9"4    2,Ioo
33"4    I9"2    I5"9    I7"9
(26"9) (I8’9) (I7"7) (22"5)
36.0 ~i9.2
(33"I) (2i.I)
29.’7
(24"9)
23"5(I5’9)
35"9(28.8)
i5.8 i7.2
(I6"5) (I7"3)
I3"6 1,35o,537
(I4’I)    (334)*
I I "8 834,529’
(i2-o) (~38)*
I9"4 16,.2.I8.7 I6.o. 471,333(17.8) (~8.5) (23"6) (I5"3) (157)
I7-5 I3-8 24-i 2i.~ 44,675
(i5.9) (i8.2) (34"I) (I5"9) (44)
~8:o I9"4 I9"6 9"2 624,53°
(I9’5) (22"o) (2I’2) (8.5) (II8)*
23"4 I3"o I4"7 I2"9 473,779(21.6) (I5"3) (I9"8) (I4"4) (iii)
I3"4 I3"7 21.2 25.4 i85,ii7(I4"3) (I4"3) (23"2) (2I’4) (56)
3I"8    I6’7 9"2    i6.i    26.2 67,III(I8"4) (t6"3)(~6’3) (30"6)" (I8"4)
(49)
*Excludlng outgoing Ceann Comhairle,
the candidates of their party.) As a test of this hypothesis We shall explore the
influence on first preference votes of rank among candidates from the same
party.
In the D~il debate on the Electoral Bill, 196~ referred to in footnote 2 above,
great emphasis was placed on the existence of 2oo to 3oo "illiterate or semi-
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illiterate" Voters in, each constituency, who vote up orldown;theballot, in the
order in which the~names are ’printedi withoUt regard tO i~arty.’ As a test of this
hypothesis
, 
we shall explore the~ effect of a candidate being in first or last
place on the ballot paperon the share of the total valid poll his party obtains
and on his share of his party’s total first preference vote.
Rank Within Party
In order to gain further insight into the voting process behind these patterns,
it is helpfulto turn our attention to the rank0f the ’candidates on the ballot
papers in their individual constituencies. In particular
, 
our first hypothesis
about voting patterns leadsus¯ to concentrate on a candidate’s frank On the
ballot paPer relative to that of the other Candidates from his party in his
constituency. In the majorityof cases there were either two or three:candidates
from each major party On the ballot. The main exception was the large number
of constituencies--(2I in all)--where only one Labour, candidate. ran. To
illustrate the hypothesised effect of alphabetical rank on voting patterns,
consider the following fictitious ballot paper:
ADAMS, P.J. (Non-Party)
-. :-
BROPHY, J. J. (F,F.)
CARTON~ M. (F:G.) "
DIGNAN, G. A. (F.G.)
’ HACKETT, P. (Lab.)
HILL, T. F: (F.F.)
KEOGH, P.J. (Non-Party)
O’KELLY., D. (F.G.)
O’TOOLE, M.J. (F.F.) ’
¯ " : SMITH,T. (Lab.)~ ’ "
Our assumption is that a voter Who had decided to vote Fianna FAil,¯ for
example, is more likely to give his first preference to Brophy than’t0 Hill or
O’Toole. Similarly, a Fine Gael voter is more likely to vote first preference for
Carton than for Dignan or O’Kel!y, and a Labour voter for Hackett rather
than for Smith.t° Of course there will’ be numerous.voters who will not vote
"the straight party ticket" and others who .will have strong preferences between
the individual candidates within a party. However, if there is a significant
numberlof voters Wholseiect their party first/and ....for whom the rankingof the
candidates ’within a party is of secondary importance, then. we expect the
X0Thls" expectation~ would, however, be modlfied,by any effect attributable to Smith being in last
position on-ballot see’, statistical analysis, belo~v.. .......
TABLE 4: Electoral performance analysed by candidates’ alphabetical rank among he candidates of their own party in same constituency.
General Election, i973
Alphabetical rank Fianna Fdil Fine Gael Labour Party Three Major Parties
among candidates
of same party in
constituency
I
2
3
Total
Candi-
dates
J
IFirst Firstprefer- Elected Candi- prefer- Electedence T.D.s dates enee T.D.s
vote
I vote
FirstCandi- prefer- Elected
dates enee T.D.s
vote
First
Candi- prefer-    Elected
dates enee T?D.s
vote
I73,978 20
II.7,595 I3
I27,I43 13
Three candidates from party in constituency
Numbers
I I6,645 I3 7 27,525
87,517 9 7 16,715
¯ 65,I34 7 7 18,o88
269,296 29 21 62,328
58 318,148 35
58 221,827 24
58 21o,365 22
¯ 29
29
87 418,716 46       66 6 I74 75o,34o 81
Percentage distribution
I 33"3 4I’6 43"5 33"3 43"3 44"8 33"3 44"2 (33"3) 33"3 42"4 43"22 33"3 28.1 28.3 33"3 32"5 3I"° 33"3 26-8 (33"3) 33"3 29"6 29"6
3 33"3 3°’4 28"3 33"3 24"I 24"I 33"3 29"o (33"3) 33"3 28"o . 27.o
Total lOO
¯ ioo ioo 1oo zoo ioo -     ioo IOO (ioo) IOO ioo IOO
: Two candidates from party in eonstituenc~
Numbers
I I I 79,639 IO 18 95,694 13 7 24,829 3 - 36 2oo, I6~" -262 II 83,731 8 18 69,5oi 7 7 2I,OI2 2 .36 I74#44 I7
Total .22 I63,37o I8 36 165,195 20 I4 45,841 5 72 374,4o6 43
Percentage distribution
I 50"0 48"7 55"6 [ 50"0 57"9 65"0 50"0 54"2 (60-0) 50"0 53"5 60"52 50"0 51"3 44"4
]     5°.0
42"1 35"0 50"0 45"8 (4o’o) 50"0 46"5 39"5
Total Ioo IOO I~Oo :i, IOO IOO IOO IOO too (IOO) "IOO IOO IOO
Notes: (a.) Niimbers in brackets are percentages of totals less than IO.
(b.) For Fialma FriLl and Fine Gael the data in this Table include all constituencies except Laois-Offaly and Carlow-Kilkelmy (where there
were either 4 or 5 candidates from those parties)’.
(c.) For the Labour Party, the data do not include the 2I constituencies where only one Labour candidate ran, nor the 7 constituencies where
there was no Labour candidate.
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order in which the candidates’ names appear on the ballot tO influence voting
patterns in favour of those who appear, first among their party!s candidates.~
In Tal~le 4-we’present a ’summary 0f the evidence from the i973 ,election.
returns,x2 The results have been analysed separately for the three major
political parties and for cases in whi,ch there: were two alnd threecandidates
from a party in a constituency. In:addition tothedistributi0n 0ffirst preference
votes by candidates’ rank within party, we present a summary of electoral
performance in terms of candidates: elected. It may be seen that the table
lends strong support, to~ Our thesis: in almost all cases the candidates who
ranked higher among their party’s candidates fared better than those who .
ranked lower. These findings are summarisedby the fact that 35 Out of the 581-
first-ranked Candidates were elected compared: with only 22 out of the same
number of third-ranked candidates. In. cases Where there were. only tWO
candidates per party; 260ut .of tlie36 first-ranked, candidates were elected,~
compared with only ix 7 out of the 36 secondranked candidates.. There were
no major contrasts in voting patterns between the three major parties in the
three-candidate:cases."In.’the two-candidate cases, the Fianna F{til first
preference Votes did not display the expected pattern, although Fine Gael and
LabourPartY votes did.lSFinally,-a study of Independent and minor part~¢
candidates in. Constituencies where there were two such candidates seemed at
first to reveal .the same .pattern found in the major parties’ votes, with 63 .per
cent of first preferences-going to the Independent candidates who were higher
on the ballot, but when Mr. Blaney’s constituency was removed, the pattern in
the remaining .io constituencies was more random, with only 51 per cent Of
thevotes g0ing to the first-ranked candidateS.
We have already seen the importance of distinguishing between incumbent-
and non-incumbent candidates. The data of Table 4 should be interpreted with
caution, as no distinction is made between the two types of candidates. In
Table 5 a-more detailed analysis’of the same data is presented.. The first
conclusion supported by Table 5 is that-incumbents on average enjoy a high
alphabetical ranking ~among their party’s Candidates. Forty per cent of
incumbents were first in rank among the (three) Candidates of their party;
for example, compared with 0n!y 28 per cent of n0n-incumbents?~ This
nThe importance of voting the "full party ticket" has been documented in one study of Irish voting
patterns, where.lt was found that 66 per cent of a sample of voters voted for all the candidates in A
party and for no-one else. Cf. Paul M. Sacks, "Bailiwicks, Locality, and Religion: Three Elements
in an Irish D~til Constituency Election", gcbnomic.and Social Review,.Vol. i, No. 4, July"197.o,P. 54°.
l~Our data source was the Irish Times, .3 March I973, with corrections, and corroborative data from
Election Results and Transfer of Votes in General Election (jTune, z969)
, 
Dublin, The Stationery Office, 197o.
X3The Fianna F~il case is readily accounted for by Mr Lynch’s performance in Cork City North-West.
Despite this, however, it will be noted that more first-ranked than second-ranked candidates were
elected for the party in the country as a whole;- ,
X*The ehi-squared values for the association between incumbency and rank are 4.2 :ir~ the 3 candi:
date case and 2.o in the two candidate case. The critical Values of test (.05 significance level) are
5.99 and 3.84, respectively.
TABLE 5- Electoral performance analysed by candidates’ alphabetical rank among the candidates of their own party in same constituency,
distinguishing incumbents and non-incumbents. General Election, 1973
Alphabetical rank
among candidates
of same party in
constituency
Candidates
Incumbents
First
preference
vote
Fianna Fdil
Elected Candidates
:I.D.s
Non-incumbents
First
preference
vote
Elected
T.D.s
Incumbents
First
Candidates preference Elected
vote T.D.s
Guel Labour Party Three m~
Non-incumbents Incumbents Non-incumbents Incumbents
zjor parties
First First First First
Candidates preference Elected Candidates preference Elected Candidates preference Elected Candidates preference Elected Candidates
vote T.D.s vote T.D.s vote T.D.s vote T.D.s
Three candidates from party in constituency
Non-incumbents
First
preference Elected
vote T.D.s
Total
16 iio,5o8 14
I5 79,509 12
12 73,803 lO
43 263,820 36
13
14
17
44
63,47o
38,o86
53,34°
15~896 IO
I3 85,963 12
8 54,I71 6
6 26,345 5
27 166,479 23
9 30,682
14 33,346
16 38,789
NUMBERS
I
3
2
39 Io2,817 6
2 I7,639 2
3 I 1,637 2
2 lO,818 2
5 9,886 o
4 5,o78 o
5 7,27° o
31 2I~IIO 28
26 145,317 20
2o 11o,966 17
27 Io~o38 7
32 76,51o 4
38 99,399 5
7 40,094 6 14 22,234 o 77 470,393 65 97 279,947 I6
37"2 41"9
34"9 3o’1
27"9 28.0
38"9 29"5 41"o
33"3 3I"8 24"6
27"8 38.6 34"4
To~l xoo ioo Ioo
Total
8 58,531 8
9 74,282 7
17 132,813 15
47"I 44"1 53"3
52"9 55"9 46"7
I00 I00 I00Total
(60"0)
(IO’O)
(30"0)
48.1 51.6 52.2
29"6 32"5 26-1
22"2 15"8 21"7
23"I 29"8
35"9 30"4
41"° 37"7
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION
(16"7)(50"0)
(33"3)
(28-6) 44"0
(42"9) 29"0
(08.6) 0",7-0
(33"3)
(33-3)
(33"3)
35"7 44"4
08.6 20.8
35"7 30"7
45"5 43"I
30.9 30.8
03.6 26.0
27"8 37"2 43"8
33.0 07"3 25"0
39"0 35"5 31"2
IOO I00 (IOO) IO0 I00 I00 IO0 IO0 (IO0) (IOO) IO0 (IO0) IOO IOO IO0 IOO IO0 I00 IO0
7 27,1o7
I3 42,966
oo 70,073
35"0 38"765.0 6i-3
I00 I00
3 oI,I08 2 I I 68,587 I I
2 9,449 1 5 26,535 5
5 3o,557 3 16 95,122 16
Two candidates from party in constituency
NUMBERS
0 3 19,106
2 o 8,53 I
4 5 27,657
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION
(5o’0) (60-0) 69"0
(50"0) (40"0) 30-8
(,oo) (ioo) ioo
68"7 72" I 68-8
3i-3 0,7.9 31.3
4 5,7033 [ 52 10,481
5      9         18,184
_
(60.0)
(4o’o)
(IOO)IO0 100 I00
(44"4) 31"4
(55 "6) 68-6
(IO0) IOO
-- 40.3
-- 33.8
-- 06.0
-- IO0
o 22
0 I6
0 38
-- 57"9
-- 42"1
-- I00
(60"0) 69-1 (66.7)
(4°.0) 30"9 (33"3)
146,244 22
IO9,348 14
255,592 36
57"0 6i-I
40"8 38"9
I00 I00(IO0) IO0 (IO0)
I4 53,9I8 4
20 64,896 3
34 118,814 7
4I"2 45"4 (57"1)
58.8 54.6 (40"9)
lOO ioo (Ioo)
)Votes: (a) Numbers in brackets are percentages of totals less than IO.
(b) For coverage of the parties, cf. note to Table 4.
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pattern is very pronounced in both two and three candidate cases in Fianna
FAil and Fine Oael, but not in the Labour Party. This: finding is a natural
reflection of the operation of the forces we are discussing over successive
elections, and its consequences have already been seen in the contrast between
the alphabetical distribution of incumbents’ and non-incumbents’ names.
In addition to confirming that there is a relation between incumbency and
rank on the ballot, Table 5 shows that even when incumbency is allowed for,
those who appear at the top of their party’s llst on a ballot have a better chance
of being elected than those in the middle or at the bottom. The importance of
this factor is shown by the fact that 7 out of 27 non-incumbents~ who were
first in rank among their party’s three candidates on the ballot gained election,
compared with only 5 out of the 38 who were in third rank. This tendency is
less clear among incumbents than among non-incumbents, since very high
proportions of incumbents were re-elected regardless of rank on ballot. It is
also evident from this more detailed analysis that candidates who ranked
second and third were about equally at a disadvantage compared with those
in first rank; in cases where the party put forward three candidates, the main
consideration was to be first among these--being second rather than third was
of much smaller advantage.
These findings may be summarised in another manner by considering the
average first preference vote of candidates in the 1973 Election classified accord-
ing to their rank on the ballot, combining the data for the three major parties:
Alphabetical rank among
party’s candidates
I
2
3
hwumbents Non-incumbents Total
Three candidates per party
6,907
5,589
5,548
3,853 5,485
2,391 3,825
2,616 3,627
Two candidates per party
6,647
6,834 p3,85I 5,5603,245 4,840
These figures clearly illustrate the operation of the factors we have been
discussing. It is arguable that the higher average vote received by ~third~, as
compared with second-, ranked non-incumbents in the three-caiididate .case ’i
reflects either the advantage gained by some of these candidates in being in
last position on the ballot, or, less probably, some slight tendency for voters
to vote up the ballot paper in reverse alphabetical order within par{y.
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Table 5, theref°r~e~ish°ws two important factors atwork; First~ the superior
average alphabetical rank of’incumbent, candidates adds to the electoral
advantage they presumably already enjoy by’virtue of their incumbency. This
is a conservative factor, ,tending to minimise change in the composition of
successive DMa. Secondly, those candidates whose surnames rank them second
or third among a party’s candidates are at a serious, disadvantage compared
with, those whose names place them first from their party On the ballot paper.
However, when a party ran only two candidates ir/a constituency, the
advantage gained" by being first was far less pronounced. Thus, the fact that
Fianna F~iil ran three candidates in 29 constituencies, Fine Gael ran three in
22, and Labour in 0n!y 7, helps:to,account for: the varying extent of the
alphabeticai distortion between the parties evident in Table I.
Overall Position on the Ballot
Up to this point we:havebeen exclusively concerned with the effect of rank
within the party on the first preference vote obtained by a candidate. The
popular impression seems to be that acandidate’s rank on the ballot as a whole
is also important. It seems to beiwidely believed, for example; that the position
of Adams, at the top of our fictitious ballot, would bestow on him a special
electoral advantage. Similarly it could be argued that: Smith’s position, in last
place on the ballot,~would tend to increase his first preference vote. As a test of
the influence of the effect of overall rank on the ballot on voting patterns,
we have compared the proportions of their parties’ first preference votes
obtained by two sets of candidates. We confined our attention to those
candidates who were in first (last) rank among the candidates of their own
party, and distinguished between those who were in first (last) position on the
ballot paper and those who were preceded (succeeded) by a candidate of
another party. Table 6 sets out the results 0fthis investigation. It may be seen
that the difference between the proportions of the parties’ first preference
votes received.by the two types of candidates is not on average large, nor is it
always in the expected direction. The number of constituencies involved in
some of these comparisonsis very small, and any judgement on the significance
of these findings is deferred to the more extensive statistical analysis, below.
A further possibility is that a party attracts additional votes by having a
candidate in first or last position on the ballot. If this is found to be the case,
it would.lend support to the hypothesis of the, 200. or 300 ,illiterate or semi-
illiterate", voters, mentioned above. Table~"7 summarises the. ass0ciation
between a party’s share of thezvalid p011 and the affiliation,.of the candidates ¯
,in first, and.last place on, the, ballot.,. The l data are. tabulated according-to: the
¯ number:of candidatesl put forward by,the party in the ,constituency, which, is
closely.related ~to the. total number, of candidates ion the ballot. It may be seen
ALPHABETICAL VOTING: A STUDY OF THE I973 GENERAL ELECTION 25
TABLE 6: Percentage of party’s first preference vote in constituency received by candidates who
were alphabetically first (last) among the candidates from their party in the constituency classified
by whether or not they were in first (last) position on the ballot. General Election, i973
Incumbents Non-incumbents
Candidate in Cahdidate first Candidate in Candidate first
first position in party but not in first position in party but not in
on ballot first position on on ballot first position on
ballot ballot
Three candidates from party in constituency
Fianna F~il 44"9 (7)       49"3 (lO)      31"9 (7)      33.8 (5)
Fine Gael 57"4 (6) 55"9 (7) 28"9 (3) 26"4 (6)
Labour Party ....
Two candidates from party in constituency
Fianna F~il 64"1 (4)         40’2 (6)           -- --
Fine Gael 69"8 (3) 66.2 (8) 52"6 (3) 38.8 (4)
Labour Party ....
Candidate in Candidate last Candidate in Candidate last
last position in party but not in last position in party but not in
on ballot last position on on ballot last position on
ballot ballot
Three candidates from party in constituency
Fianna F~il 42"8 (3) 41"° (9) 25.0 (4) 21.o (13)
Fine Gael 54"2 (I) 29.8 (5) 2I’8 (7) 19"8 (9)
Labour Party 80.0 (1) 64.6 (I) 3"4 (I) 20"3 (4)
Two candidates from party in constituency
Fianna Fg~il 63"5 (2) 51’° (7) -- --
Fine Gael 58.2 (I) 59"7 (4) 43.0 (5) 29.5 (8)
Labour Party --
-- 42"6 (2) 4o’I (3)
NOTES :
(a) The percentages recorded above are the average of the percentages in the constituencies in
question.
(b) The number of constituencies involved in each calculation is given in parentheses.
(¢) -- indicates that party did not have candidates in both situations.
that the evidence does not support the view that having a candidate first on the
ballot exercises a strong influence on the party’s share of the valid poll, but
there is more support for the hypothesis that having a candidate in last place
raises a party’s share of the valid poll. (It is of interest that the only two
candidates not members of a major party who were elected in this Election
were respectively in first and last place on their ballot papers.) The apparent
importance of being in last place on the ballot sheds light on the fact that,
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among’Labour Party and non-party Candidates
, 
those with P-=Z names obtained
more thafftheir share of the first preference V6~te ~(gee Table 3)-is Once again,
the ass’essment 0f’the Statistical Significanc’e o( thesefindings iS deferred’. : :
As a further test of the influence of first and last position on, the ballot, we
examined all Cases in which the candidate in, first or last place in a constituency
changed between the Election of I969 and I973 from a member of one party
to a member of another. Table 8sets out the results of this exercise. It is clear
that, for all three parties, where the party’s:candidate: was displaced from the
top position on the ballot in I973, the party’ improved on its national perform-
ance. In cases where Fianna F~il and Fine Gael were displaced from last
position on the ballot in 1973, they alsoimproved on their national performance.
The Labour Party actually did relatively worse in constituencies where its
candidates obtained first 0r last position on the ballot in i973 than in other
constituencies. Thus, the comparison0f I969and 1973 results suggests thatI
having a candidate in first or last position on the ballot has little; if any, effect
on the parties’ performance in a constituency in one election compm:ed ~vith
another.
TABLE 7: Party’s share of valid poll in Constituencies classified according to whether party had a
candidate in first (last) position on ballot, General Election, 1973
Fianna F~il
Fine Gael
Labour
Fianna F~il
Fine Gael
Labour
Labour
(Percentages)
Party had Party did not have Party had Party did not have
candidate in candidate in candidate in candidate in
‘first position first position last position last position
on ballot on ballot on ballot on ballot
Three candidates from party in constituency
46"4 (14)      44"8 ~(I5) 44’4 (7) 45"9"i(22)
35,6 (9) 38’o:(I3)-     39"9 (8) .35-4 (I4)
25"I (7) 28"4 (2) 23"8 (5)
Two candidates from Party in constituency
48.i,:(5) 51.3 (6) 52"4 (2) 49"3 (9)
27:9 (5) 33.6 (13) 36"0 (6) 30.0 (I~)
¯ 17:1 (7) 1.6"9 (2) 17"2 (5)
One candidate from party in constituency
t5"3 (2) II’7 (19) ’: I9"2 (4) 1°"3 (I7)
NOTE: Number Of constituencies in parentheses. - , .
XSln the light of these findings, the remarks of the thea Minister. for Local, Government, Mr Blaney,
during the 1963 D~I debate, assume a new significance: "So long as you are not cluttered up and
crowded out in the middle, you are all right. At either end of the paper, you ha~/e a good :~hance.
If someone knows y0uare at the bottom he will not miss the bottom.-He will not miss the top either.
If y0u are in the middle, the possibility is your bitterc~t enemy will get your vote". Dgtil Debates,
Vol. ~oo, No. 3, Cols: 517, 518. " " :’ "" ’    "" "" ’’’ " "
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TABLE 8: Party’s share of valid poU in 1973 as percentage of its share in 1969
Fianna Frill:
All constituencies 1OI"3Constituencies where a Fianna F~il candidate was FIRST on ballot in
1973 but not in 1969 (9 cases) lO3.1
Constituencies where Fianna F~iil candidate was FIRST on ballot in 1969
but not in 1973 (3 cases) lO3.2
Constituencies where a Fianna F~il candidate was LAST on ballot in 1973
but not in i969 (5 cases) lO6.O
Constituencies where a Fianna F~iil candidate was LAST on ballot in 1969
but not in 1973 (6 cases) lO4.O
Fine Gael:
All constituencies lO2.8
Constituencies where a,Fine Gael candidate was FIRST on ballot in 1973
but not in 1969 (3 cases) 108.9
Constituencies where a Fine Gael candidate was FIRST on ballot in 1969
but not in 1973 (3 cases) lO5.9Constituencies where a Fine Gael candidate was LAST on ballot in 1973
but not in 1969 (5 cases) 1 lO.8
Constituencies where a Fine Gael candidate was LAST on ballot in 1969
but not in 1973 (5 cases) lO2.2
Labour Party:
All constituencies* 84.oConstituencies where a Labour Party candidate was FIRST on ballot in
1973 but not in I969 (i case) 64.3Constituencies where a Labour Party candidate was FIRST on ballot in
1969 but not in 1973 (6 cases) 85.o
Constituencies where a Labour Party candidate was LAST on ballot in
1973 but not in 1969 (3 cases) 77.o
Constituencies where a Labour Party candidate was LAST on ballot in
1969 but not in 1973 (7 cases) 83.9
*Constituencies where the Labour Party ran candidates in both the I969 and i973 elections.
Transfer Votes
g further aspect Of Voting patterns under the system of’the Single Transfer-able Vote may be documented from the i973 Election results. There is
some evidence in Tables 4 and 5 of a slight tendency for candidates
who ranked last of three in a party to" have done worse in terms of election or
defeat than would have been expected on the basis of their first :preference
votes. Thus, last-ranked candidates (non-incumbents) receiVed 35"5 per cent
of their parties’ first preference votes, but accounted for only 31.2 per cent of
the elected T.D.s. Among Fine Gaeln0n-incumbents~ those in second position
received the lowest average first preference vote (2,382, c0mparedwith 3,409
and 2,424 for those in first and last rank, respectivelY),, but had the highest
proportion Of candidates elected 3 out of I4, Compared with ~ out Of 9 and
2 out of I6 in the other ranks ..... i ~
Non-incumbents of course tend to be quite dependent on transfers in gaining
election. It is easy to imagine that once a voter has selected the candidate to
whom he gives his first preference vote the position of the remaining candidates
in the same ’party affect~ .their" chances of receiving.his second and third
preferences. On our fictitious baliot,~ if, a voter "Votes the Fine; Gael Ticket",
for example, we have seen that heiS most likely ,tO give his first preference to
Carton. If Carton receives the first ~preference vote, ,theni:it seems reasonable
tO assume that the voter is more likely to vote his Second preference for Dignan
and his third preference for O’KeUy, rather tha~ ~0 give his sec0ndpreference
to O’Kelly and his third to Dignan. Similarly, if the candidate in third rank
amon these three ~ets the first preference Vote (itsel(a less common occur-
rance), it Seems more likely that the one in the second rank would get the
second preference and the one at the top wouldget the third preference. When
the candidate in the middle gets the first preference, it seems about equally
likely that either of the other two would get the second or third preference.
These voting patterns may be illustrated from our fictitious ballot :as follows:
(ignoring the non-Fine Gael candidates)
Voting Pattern
A B. C. D E F
Carton, M. (F. G.) I z
Dignan, G. A. (F. G.) 2 3
O’Kelly, D. (F. G.) : - 3 2
28
3
!        1
3       2
3 2
2 3
I I
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There are two possible patterns of transfer votes corresponding to each of the
three possible first preference votes. Our hypothesis is that voting pattern A is
more frequent than B, and E than F. We expect little difference between
C and D. These hypothesis can be tested by looking at the pattern of transfers
from candidates such as Carton, Dignan and O’Kelly, provided the distribution
of their votes occurs when there are still two candidates from their party in
the contest. Obviously, this can happen for only one of the candidates in a
constituency where the party runs three candidates. In Table 9 the relevant
data are summarised, showing the proportion of transfers going to candidates
TABLE 9: Distribution of transfers within a party according to alphabetical rank of candidates.
General Election, 1973
(Two candidates from the party still in the Contest at the time of the distribution)
Alphabetical rank
within party of
candidates receiving
transfers:
2
3
Total
I
3
Total
Total
Labour Party
Three major
Fianna Fdil Fine Gad parties
d~t’O"No. per cent per cent[ No. per cent No. per cent
I
Candidates whose votes were distributed ranked first within party
20,I7I IO0(Io)*
7,o71 65"3
3,761 34"7
IO,832
(8)
IOO 2,386 IOO
(I)
22,805 68"3
I°,584 3I’7
33,389 IOO
(I9)
Candidates whose
6,688 52 "3
6,o9o 47"7
I2,778 IOO(6)* 8,I31(5)
Candidates whose
votes were distributed ranked second within party
44"4 374 39"o’ IO,672 48.8
55.6 586 61.o ii,i97 51.2
ioo 96o IOO 21,869 IOO
(i)           (12)
votes were distributed ranked third within party
16,493 ioo
(~)*
3,319 34"3
6,355 65"7
9,674
(7)
IOO
1,814 29"9
4,244 7o’I
6,058
(4)
IO0
*Number of distributions on which based.
NOTES:
(a) If these percentages are regarded as samples from a point binomial distribution, all of the
differences between pairs of ranks recorded above are highly significant statistically.
(b) The distribution of surplus votes is based on the total second preference vote. The surplus votes
included in the above table have not been "grossed up" to reflect the total number of second preferences
involved, since it is only the surplus flint affects the election results.
30          ~ THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE
of the same party according to’ their rank among the :party’s candidates. The
results confirm our expectati0ns:very, strongly. It seems to be quite c0mmonf0r
a voter,= having" chosen Which of a part, y’s candidates gets~his first :preference
Vote; to allow alphabetical considerati6ns to dictate the allocation’ 6fhis second
preference vote.ae ’ :~ ’ ’ ’ ¯ ,, :.i ~ , . , ..
These patterns also hold for votes transferred across party lines. There were
16,185 votes transferred tocandidates of partiesthat had three remaining
candidates ranked :alphabetically below the candidate whose transfers :were
being :distributed ; (equivalent ’to: what would- happen, o’fi .the :elimination or
election of Adams on our ballot). Of these transfers 42"5 per cent went to the
candidates who ranked first among the’ three, 37..4 t°~ tl~e, Second,ranked
and only 2o. I per cent t° the third-ranked. Where there were 0n, ly two remain-
ing candidates in a. party at the time., of the distribution, the first-ranked
candidates obtained 56.3 per cent of the transfers, the second-ranked. 43"7.per
cent (there were 7,984 transfers involved). These cross-party transfers tend to
be more numerous in a -Coalition,situation than in the. 1969 Election. ~ , ,’
This factor may be seen tO operate to the detrimentof those whorank last,
and to a smaller extent, .tii0se who rank first,, among the party’s candidates.
The candidate in the middle benefits due to his relative proximity to both the.
first’and the:third Candidate. The foregoing Calculationsconcentrate exclusively
on rank: and take no account of’the prOximity On thUballot of the candidates
involved in, the distribution. In. general :we believe that rank is of more import-
ance than proximity, although in many situations both factors may play a role.
To explore this approach, We calculated the effect of proximity on the transfers
received by the Fine Gael party:. Of the 58,606 transfers received by Fine Gael
candidates ,while there were still ~at least two :Fine,,,Gael candidates in the
contest, 59:" I per cent went tothe Candidate who was’ "nearest" the name whose
transfers were being distributed. This analysis of the~ effect of proximity seems
to support the view that this is also a meaningful way of analysing the, manner
in. which secondand lower preference votes are assigned.
.=
16The data of Table 9 Were-analysed separately for distributions ’involving elected and elimiiaated
candidates without any differences between the two ituations emerging.               , :
,’=%
RegressiOn Analysis of Voting Behaviour
First Preference Votes
M ANY readers may be content to take the tabulations of the I973Election results as significant in themselves, without regard to technical
statistical considerations. This point of view gains support from the
consideration that TaMes 3-9 summarise all the votes cast in the specified
situations in the Electi0n. Our commentary has, however, tended to use these
data as the basis for inference about voting behaviour of a wider significance
than mere!y the’outcome of one election. We have implied that the patterns
evident in the 1973 returns may be deemed characteristic of voting behaviour
under Proportional Representation with alphabetically arranged ballots. To
substantiate such inferences it is necessary to undertake more intensive statistical
testing.
We have adopted the following approach to the statistical testing of hypo-
theses based on the 1973 Election data. Treating the number of first preference
votes obtained by a candidate as the dependent variable, a number of
"independent variables" or regressors have been defined. These regressors
were almost all dichotomous (o, I) in nature, designed to reflect whether
or not a candidate fell into a specified category or situation. Thus, the regression
analysis performed on these data consisted of regressing a continuous dependent
variable on a set of dichotomous or dummy regressors. This procedure is
equivalent to an analysis of variance approach, but yields estimates of the
magnitude of the effects of various situations on candidates’ first preference
votes.
The prinicpal regressors used were
X, = I if candidate was first in alphabetical rank anmng his party’s
candidates in constituency,
o otherwise.
I if candidate was third in alphabetical rank among his party’s
candidates in constituency,
o otherwise.
Xa = I if candidate was in first place on the ballot in his constituency,
o otherwise.
X~ = I if candidate was in last place on the ballot in his constituency,
o otherwise.
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These four variables measure the candidates’ alphabetical rank among all
candidates (X3 and X,) and among their party’s candidates (X1 and X,) in a
constituency. The statistical significance of these variables is a test of the
hypotheses discussed in this papei’. OUi" main emphasis has been on the
influence of rank among party candidates iX1 and X,), but we saw that there
was some evidence to suggest that a position at one or other extremity of the
ballot (Xa and X~) also influenced the numbel/ of,votes obtained. It should
be Stressed that our hypothesis concerning position at either extremity of the
b~tllotl is a relatively crude one, since presumably being second-last may be
more advantageous than being third-last, and so on. we have not tested more
detailed hypotheses of this nature.
In addition to these Variables, Other regressors were introduced to control
for the effect of factors that might beexpected to exercise a major influence On
voter behaviour:
if candidate was an incumbent,
otherwise.
if candidate was a member of Fine Gael,
otherwise:
if candidate was a member of the Labour ~Party~
otherwise.
if candidate’s party ran only tWO candidates in constituency,
otherwise,
X0= I if candidate was party’s only candidate in constituency,
o otherwise.
X10 = I if candidate was a close relative of an incumbent (see footnote 5),
o otherwise.
Xll = the number of incumbents (other than the candidate) from
the candidate’s party running in the constituency.
Numerous other, more explicitly "political", considerations might be taken
into account :in a more~ detailed study, but these variables seemed adequate
to aUow us to isolate the net influence of variables i to 4.
Our regression model may be viewed as an attempt to isolate the effect.
singly or in combinations, of the io situations measured by variables Xx to Xx0,
TABLE IO: Regression coeffcients of candidates’ first preference votes regressed on alphabetical rank among candidates of same party in
constituency and position on ballot paper, with t-ratios in ~Oarentheses. General Election, 1973
Equation
number
9
IO
II
I2
Intercept
2655**
(7"22)
6188"*
(4"7o)
2620**
(6.79)
2676**
(6-09)
17o6"
(2.67)
4988**(8.8,)
3II3**
(II.99)
6154"*
(I5.8o)
3768**
(9.66)
First among Third among First place on Last place on Other variables
party’s candidates party’s candidates ballot ballot included in regression
xl & & x4
1,54o** 488
(2"79) (I’oI)
--702
(0"53)
747 -- I,o92"(1.3I) (i.97)
2,174"* I ~OO5(2-90) (I.2I)
27I
(0-36)
1,419"* 5 Xs, X6, XT, Xlo
(3.99) (o.o)
5IO
o.Ol)
929** --274 Xs, X6, XT, Xs,
(3"26) (0"87) Xg, Xlo
784 --633
(I.62) (I.o5)
968**
--37 XG, XT, Xo
(2.92) (O.I I) X9
, 
X:Lo
, 
Xl1
Fianna Fdil : 3 candidates in a constituency
I83 503 Xs, Xlo(0.28) (0"69)
Fianna Fdil : 2 candidates in a constituency
1,724 1,826 X5(I’I3) (o.92)
Fine Gad: 3 candidates in a constituency
--221 1,367 + Xs, X:to
(0.32) (I.9I)
Fine Gad: 2 candidates in a constituency
-- 14o 1,619" X5(0.20) (2-29)
¯ Labour Party: 3 candidates in a
constituency
--626 X5(0.53)
Labour Party: 2 candidates in a
constituency
87I Xs(0-79)
Labour Party: I candidate in a
eonstituen(y
1,985            1,2o9 X5(I.56)    -    (0.93)
Three major parties : 3 candidates
in a constituency
--62 678
(o.I4) (1.42)
Three major parties: 2 candidates
in a constituency
499 1,3o7 + Xs, Xn, X7(0.75) (I.96)
Three major parties: all candidates
366 I,O28"*
(1.oi) (2.9°)
Three major parties : all incumbents
28I 1,328 + Xb, XT, X8
(o.48) (1.73) X9
Three major parties:
all non-incumbents
638 8oo*
(I.46) (2.45)
¯ o.4----
~
I °°1
F-value(degrees of
freedom)
14.o2"*
(6,80)
o’97
(4,I7)
14.99"*
(6,59)
8.55**(4,3i)
I2-53"*
(4:6)
8.44**
(3:0)
5.60**
(3,17)
27-39
(8,165)
i5.32"*
(6,65)
32.33**
(lO,256)
1.87 +
(8,ILO)
>
0
<
o
°°
>
o
ZO
O0
o
N
**Significant, 99 per cent confidence level. *=Significant, 95 per cent confidence level. + =Significant, 90 per cent confidence level.
(Two-tailed tests)
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The reference situation (whose average first preference vote is estimated by the :.
equation’s intercept) is a Fianna F~iil non-incumbent candidate who is
alphabetically second among the three candidates from his party in his
constituency, and who is in neither firstnor last posltaon:’on the:ballot. -. : ¯
Table IO sets out the coefficients estimated for the four principal regressors
for the entire sample of 267 major party candidates and for several sub-
samples,aT The estimated t-values of thecoefficients are also Shown in Table I%
as well as the R~ and F-value for each equation. It may be seen that :X1 Ifirst
among party’s candidates) is significant in six of the equations in Table io
and sometimes at a very high confidence level. Last position on ballot (X4)
is also significant in some important equations. Third among party’s candidates.
(X,) and first position on ballot (X3) are generally not significant at any high
confidence level, although the predominance of coefficients with the expected
sign is to be noted. There is, however, considerable variation between the
equations in the estimates of the individual coefficients,,as is to be expected in
the light of the relatively large standard errors associated with these coefficients.
The high18 ~*s:recorded in equations I to 9 (with the exception of equation
2) reflects, Of course, the importance of factors such as incumbency (Xs) and
party affiliation (Xs, X~). Hence it is o£ great" interest to see thatWhen the
sample isdivided into incurfibents and non-incumbents, the R~ falls almost
to zero for incumbents (equation I I) but" remains relatively high (0.39) for
non-incumbents (equation I2).l9 None Of the variables in equation ii is
statistically significant, nor is the whole equation :significant by theF-test
although the individual coefficients all have the expected signs. On the other
hand, in equation i2 several variables are highly significant (including X1
and X4) and the Overall equation is very significant by the F-test. These tWO
equations are given in full below: (dependent variable- candidate’s first:
preference vote)
Incumbents:
6154+784X~--633X~+28IX3+I328X4 68IX~
(I5.8o) (I.62)(I.05) (0.48) (I.73) (I.64)
-998XT-l-38oXs-k-321X9 ks -o.o6
(I.52) (0.87) (o.25)
1’For various subasamples, the reference .~ituafi6n must be_ appropri~itely adj~ted; For the Labour
Party candidates running in constituencies where 0nly one Labour Party candxdate rag. (e.quatlo,n 7
in Table IO), the reference situation is a non-incumbent Labour Party canclldate. WhO is m nexmer
first nor last position on the ballot.
18Hi~h/that is, in view of the very limited range of factors measured by our regy.e~ors.. .
aVrhe sel~aration of ineumbent~ and non:incumbehtsis of interest from a’ political viewpoint, even
though the F-test for differential slopes is not significant for these two equations.
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Non-incumbents:
3768 + 968X1 --37X~-{- 638Xa + 899X4
(9.66) (2.92)(o.Ii)(I.46) (2.45)
--I I83X --237IXT+799Xs+I479X9
(4.20) (6.39) (2.48) (2.67)
÷42oaX%0--533Xl~ R~ =.388
(4.IO)     (2.4I)
It is striking that incumbents’ votes seem largely unrelated to the variables we
have included in our analysis, as is clear from the near-zero kS. The estimated
coefficients of variables X6 to Xn, and the contrasts between incumbents and
non-incumbents are of great interest and of a wider significance than the
performance of variables X~ to X4, which are the main focus of the present
study. Detailed discussion of these findings would, however, be out of place
in the present context.
Both of these equations include "intercept shift" dummy variables to take
account of such major factors as party affiliation, number of party candidates
in constituency, etc. A test was performed to assess whether or not the slopes of
variables X1 to X, are homogeneous in all of these Situations (is there, for
example, a significant difference between the slope of X1 between the three
major parties or between cases where a party ran three, two, or only one
candidate?). This test consisted of introducing "interaction variables" defined
as the product of X1, X~, X3 and X~ separately with each of X6, X7 and Xs.
In the case of incumbents, the ]q2 without any interaction terms was o.o72
,
and the maximum R~ attained with interactions was o.o77. For non-incumbents
the R~-rose from o.388 to a maximum of o.4o8. In both cases, there was some
evidence of significant interaction between first place on ballot and the Labour
Party, and first rank in party and the Labour Party. These interactions may
be summarised for non-incumbents as follows: (with standard errors in
parentheses)
Candidate from
Labour Party Fianna Fdil
or Fine Gael
Xe* ~ffea of"
First place on ballot (Xa) ,,965 14
(1,o2I) (47o)
First among party candidates (Xa) 36 ,,485
(594) (387)
(The .coefficients in the equation above may be seen as a weighted average
of these.)
, k
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TABLE I I: Estimated net effecta-of., various situations on a candidate’s first’preference vote,
with standard errorsb in parentheses
First among party’s First among party’s Third among party’s Third among party’s
candidates and first candidates but not first candidates,but not last candidates and’last
position on ballot position on ballot position on ballot position on ballot
Incumbents
+I,O66"[" +784 --633 ¯ " @695
(565) (485) (6o~) . . (83.7)
Non-incumbents
+ 1,6o6"* +968** --37 : +863*
(4o7) (333) (334) " ...... . (418)
**Significantly different from zero, 99.per confidence level : ....
*Significant, 95 per cent confidencelevel. ~, ~
tSignificant, 9° per cent confidence level.
aThat is, estimated increase or decrease in vote by comparison With candidate who was ’alphabetically
second among thOse put forward by his party in a constituency, and in neither first nor last position on
the ballot. Based on equations x I and t2 in Table 9.
bFor first and third columns, based ’on. formula Va/’." :(,7(£ + Xa) = Var. Xa ;+:Var.;Xa + ~ Coy. Xr Xa.
In’evaluating the results for the ]~t~gfour’ VaiiableS it must be btJrxie in mind
that there is a high orrelati0n between X:I and Xa andbetvceen X2 and X~:~
most of’th0Se Who were in’ first pbsit{6n~ on the brdl0t Were alS0 first of three
or two Candidates from"their party,~ ~tnd most of th0se who were last On the
ballot were als0iast Of ~three Candidates fromlth~ir party)° The correlation
coefficients are: " ? " " ~ " ~: ¯
’ " ~ .~ " : : ~.~" ": ~- In’cumbents- " ’ Non-incumbents: "
X1 and Xs .:, 0"50 .: 0"47, " " "
X~ and ’X[ o’24:- " " 0"3 I
These interc6rrelations are not’ aiiauiy it;~ the: light 6f tiie R~ for the
equations, bug i/l Simati0ils Where:a’ ca~ididkte was c6ded i ’in aft] two, of these
categories, more importance should be attached :to the sum of the coefficier/ts~
than to eitherof them singly. : For this reason, equations I I and .I2 have been
used to calculate the results presented in Table I i. In this table, the estimated
effect on first preference votes ofbeing in various combinations ot~ situations
may be seen. (The results .for incumbents are not significantly.different from
zero in any case.) It may be seen that the most advantageous situation is to
be both first among the party’s candidates and in fii~sg pdsitioil on the’~ballot,
the next most advantageous situation is first among the party’s candidates even
2°The main~ exceptions are those Labour Party candidates Who were in first or last position on the
ballot in constituencies Where only One ]Labour Party candidate ran.
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while not in first position on the ballot. The least advantageous situation is to
be third among the party’s candidates while not in last position on the ballot.
These findings must be used in conjunction with the standard errors recorded
in Table i i, which in some cases would not support the hypothesis of a signi-
ficant:difference between the effects of various situations. This analysis is an
extension of that presented in Table 5 and shows that, for non-incumbents at
least, the vote obtained is significantly influenced by position on ballot and
position among party’s candidates.
Parties’ Share of Valid Poll
In the earlier analysis, the importance of first and last position on the ballot
was assessed by examining the share of the valid poll obtained by the parties
in constituencies where their candidates occupied these positions. As a formal
test of the hypotheses that first and/or last position on the ballot influences
a party’s share of the poll, we now use the percentage of the total first pre-
ference vote in a constituency obtained by a party as the dependent variable
m a regression analysis employing the following regressors-
X12 =the number of incumbents put forward by the party in a constituency
divided by the total number of incumbents running in the consti-
tuency. 21
X18----the number of non-incumbents put forward by the party divided by
the total number of non-incumbents in the constituency.
and Xs, X4--dummies for first and last place,
X6, XT,--dummies for Fine Gael, Labour Party.
(X12 and X13 are not dummy variables, but they are restricted in
range from o to I, and assume only a limited number of values in this
range.)
In Table 12 the results of tllis analysis are presented. The first equation is
very satisfactory (in the light of ~2, etc.) but it is clear from equations 2, 3
and 4 that disaggregation is important, because the estimated coefficients of
the regressors differ quite markedly between the three major parties. The
extremely high levels of significance of X1, and X18 are satisfactory, but are
not our main concern. It is however, worth drawing attention to the fact that
the coefficient of X18 was always very much smaller than that of X12: it is
clearly far more important for a party to put forward a high proportion of the
incumbents, than of the non-incumbents, in a constituency. Our main interest
lies in the coefficients of X3 and X4. It may be seen that neither of these is
elThe two "sons of incumbents" were classified as incumbents in this analysis.
T,IBLE Xo: Regressions on parties’ share of valid poll in each constituency. General Election, x973
(regression coefficients, with t-ratio in parentheses)
F-va~
F, quationI tercept I~ variables "R : (degrees of
lumber fr~ddm ) ~
3
4 --0.84
(o-37)
Ineumbents from party
:’divided by total number
of incumbents in "
comtitaenc) .....
.: ¯
X1j
Non-inatmbents from Par~ candidate
Par~ candidate Fine Gael i
party divided by total first on ballot last on ballot
number of non-imumbents
in constituency, :
¯ "Xas Xv X, X,
27.o4" *
(4.86)
2.55*
-x.74 :
(0.79)
Three major parties combined
x8.77"* " --0.05
(4-9x) . (0.04)
Fianna F dil
x 1.64 + -- x.6o
(x.78) (0.83)
Fine Gad
I5’.20* 0.27
¯ (2’42) : (o./5)
: Labour Party -
38.64** 6.94*
(5.26) (2. x ~ )
28:34"* " ~ 4.6x*(5.38)" (",a!)
5L38.* 3.7] +
(8.4o) " (z.92)
"5
--9"53**
(7.56)
labour ....
.:
¯ :2 :i
"
i’
--x8.53"* 0.86 - :x25.29"* "
(m.o2) :[ "" (6,xx2):,, :
": 0.35" 6.6x**
" ,o-47 ’
¯
, ’’, L ,.,
IO.~l~1/* ,(
"(4,37) ,
m73 :o3.46** :"
. (4,ao)
**=Significant, 99 per cent level; *=Significant, 95 per cent level; %=Significant, 90 percent level. " :" ¯ -. : "~::.?
Notes: ’(a) For equation x, Fianna F~il comfimtes the reference category. . . . ~..-
(b) Dependent variable is.measured as per cent. ...
(c). The value of the F-test for differential slopes between the three parties is 2~56, with8 and z o4 degTees of freedom, significant at-the. 95
per cent level.
. : ¯ . :
(d) The relatively low ~2 for equation 2 maybe due, at least in part, to the small .variance. of the dependent variable, The c0efficiems of:
variation for the dependent variables of the four equations are, in order, 43:7,per Cent,: I4.~ per cent, ~1.5 per cent~ ~md 53.5 per cent.: ’
/,
*d
t~
t,t
0
0
8
0
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significant for Fianna F~iil (equation 2), but both are for the Labour Party
and X4 is for Fine Gael. Thus, having a candidate in last place on the ballot
does seem to have attracted votes to Fine Gael and the Labour Party, and
having a candidate in/first place attracted votes to the Labour Party.22
These results suggest that the effect of being last, and to a lesser degree, first,
on the ballot is not so much to attract votes away from other candidates of the
same party as to attract.votes away from candidates of other parties. The
existence Of this effect, ’and the fact that it seems to operate for Fine Gael and
Labour only, is an important finding.23 It should, however, be recalled that
the net effect of simply being first among the candidates of one’s party has been
seen in Tables 9 and IO to exceed that of being in first or last place, on the
ballot3a
In concluding this section, it may be claimed that the regression analysis
supports the conclusions arrived at by the simple tabulation of the statistical
material. Although our alialysis has not been very intensive, we believe we
have shown certain regularities in the data that have a much wider interest
than simply establishing the existence of alphabetical voting, lZefinements of
the analysis used here have occurred, and been suggested, to us during the
course of the present study. It might be desirable; for example, to refine our
measure of "incumbency" to take account of whether a candidate held mini-
sterial rank. Among non-incumbents, it has been suggested that whether the
candidate ran in the last election may influence his vote in this election. Both
these points might be taken care of by using "first preference vote in previous
election" as an independent variable, but some difficulties may arise from that
procedure. Similarly, it would be possible to refine the analysis so that a
continuous variable is used to replace "first" or "last" on ballot, and statistical
criteria are used to assess the optimal position on a ballot of a given size.
Furthermore, the highly significant intercept terms in the shares’ equations
(Table I~, equations 3 and 4) suggest that further attention needs to be paid
to the specification of these equations, With a view to exploring the existence
of non-linearities. We have not pursued these possibilities in the present paper,
believing as we do that although refinements might increase the sophistication
of the analysis, they are unlikely to alter our main conclusions about alpha-
betical voting.
22This finding is consistent with our earlier discussion of the interaction between Labour Party
and first on ballot. However, it is important to point out that the Labour Party occupied the first
position on the ballot in only two constituencies.
23We tested the hypothesis that the two Coalition parties gained at each others’ expense, and found
less support for this hypothesis than for the one tested in Table I~.
24This holds true for non-incumbents, although the differences may not be statistically significant.
For incumbents, last place on ballot seems to be worth more than first among party’s candidates,
but both coefficients are sub iect to very large standard error.
The 1969 General: Election .....
~’N order to test our hypotlieses on, additional data, we ¯have: performed some
| analysis 0n the x 960 Election. This Electi0n differed from¯ that of x 973 in a
.L number of Ways,¯ most importantlY.~ in, that ’,there,were" ~7: Cases¯, where ,the
major parties :ran 4 candidates in a constituency (comPared with 2 cases of 4
candidates: and 2 of 5 in i973, all of which were~ excluded from our analysis).
Moreover, the number of major party non-incumbents running in i969 was
229, compared with¯ 148 in i 973. Finally,. in i969, Fine, Gael and ~ the Labour
Party did not form a, Coalition.. SOme’or.:all, of these fa~ctors may havre implica-
tions for the Voting patterns we have shown existed in.the i;97.3, Election., : :,
¯ In Table 13 ’the-average:first preference .vote: received by~ candidates is- set
out, classified by incumbency, :number,of candidates running,’ and rank among
candidates from~ the,. party.! If, attention is,:confined tO the last column
, 
(in-
cumbents and non-incumbents combined)it may be :seen that those.in ,first
rank always,obtained the highest:average first .preference vote:.~this is in
conformity with .Table 4,, for the !973. ElectiOn. When,: however
, 
incumbents
and non-incumbents are studied separately
, 
~ the ,pattern is legs clear.In the
cases where a party ran four candidates, the second rank ;among the four
obtained the lowest first preference vote,’ but those in third place did quitewell.
Where there were three candidates from a party in a constituency, incumbents
conformed to the expected pattern, but non,incumbents did not. When there
were two candidates, non-incumbents conformed~to the expected pattern, but
incumbents did not. In Table 14,. the results are .set out in terms of candidates
and T.D.s elected. The same pattern of conformity and discrePancy with the
expected pattern is evident in this i table:as: was seen~ in Tab!e i ~. The most
striking departure from the 1973 pattern is the ,very high proportion of middle-
ranked non-incumbents who were elected in cases where the party ,ran three
candidates (I3 out of4o,. compared-with only 6 out of 37 first-ranked candi-
dates). At first this may appear very strong evidence against the hypothesis that
the patterns described for the i973 Election also operated in i969. It should,
however, be recalled that Table I~ Showed a difference of only 62 (or 2 per
cent) between the average first preference ,votes of candidates, in these ranks.
The very high proportion of second-ranked candidates elected must, therefore,
reflect the advantage enjoyed by these candidates in obtaining:transfer votes.
Looking at the within-party transfers received by second-ranked candidates,
i     . ,.
a pattern similar tO that shown by Table 9 for i973 emerges. Candidates who
4°
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TABLE 13" Average first preference vote per candidate, three major parties combined: General
Election; ~x 969.
Alphabetical rank ....
among candidates of Incumbents ~. Non-incumbents- "Total
same party in
.~
constituency Four candidates from party in constituency ..
I 6,737 ., 3,o6o 3,925
2 4,826 ," 1,3o2 2,13i
3 6,768 2,21 o 2,746
4 5,389 1,721 2,369
Three candidates from party in constituency
a 6,684 2,864 ~ 4,509
2 5,757 2,926 " 4,o15
3 5,723 2,495 3,488
Two candidates from party in constituency
a 5,429 2,973 3,623
2 6,787 a,841 2,587
ranked second out of three from the same party ’received 43,9Ol transfers from
within thear party when there were two candidates left at the tame of the
distribution, comp:ar~d ’with 26; i6o r~ceiVed by those in first rank, and 26,o7i
by those in third’rankl " :’" ’~’ ’"" " ’ .......
Thus the 62-vote (or 2 per cent) advantage in average first preference vote
obtained by second:rank’ed candidates i~"overshadowed,by the 266 (or 27 per
cent) advantage in theiraverage tri~nsfer from another’candidate of the same
party in situations where two party candidates remained in the race at the
time of the distribution. This advantage in transfer votes reflects the voting
pattern in which second p)cefereffce ’is given to the pa)ty’s candidate who is
nearest the candidate who receivedthe first preference vote. This feature of
the 1969 results is consistent with the within-party transfer voting pattern
discussed in connection with the 1973 Election.
Finally
, 
the regression analysis developed for the 1973 results was applied
to the 1969 data. Two additional variables were defined to cope with the 17
cases where a party ran 4 candidates, namely,
X~4 =I if candidate is 4th among party’s candidates,
o otherwise
and X~ 5 = 1 if party ran four candidates in constituency,
o otherwise
The only equations run were for all incumbents and all non-incumbents.
The results were (dependent variable =candidates first preference vote),
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Incumbents: ¯ ~ ~
62o5--k4Xl+ Io8X, -- 193X14q- 136oX3
(O,OI). (0,25) (o.I4) (2.03)
+ 136X4 "759X e -- I416X~ + 386X.
(o.2o) (I.67)    (2.o8) (o.7o)
+2737X’~ +3I oX15 ¯
(2:37) (0.43) ~’ =o’o7
,Non-incumbents:
3985 q- 591X1 q- I5X~ 31 IX14 -- 62X3(I0,54) (I,8I) (0,08), (O,J~9)’" .....
(0,i3) .
--I42X4 -- 789Xs" 2199X~ ;
(0.34) (2.26) (5"44)
q--I4X8 -- 354X9- 298Xx 5
(0.04) (0.39) (0.76)" /
--589Xll
(2.44)                 R2 =o.I4
As with the 1973 results, the equation is more successful for non-incumbents
than for incumbents. However, . the !969 results are statistically far !ess con-
clusive than were the i973results. The only Variables relating toposition on
TABLE I4: Number of candidates and T.D;s elected ciassifiedby alphabetical rank among
candidates from same party. General Election, i969
Alphabetical
rank among
candidates. Incumbents Non-incumbents ~ :Total
of same " " ....
party in Candidates Elected
¯Candidates Elected Candidates Elected
constituency
I
2
3
4
4
4" ’
2
3
Fo.r candidates from pariy in co iituency
4 ’ x3 ’ 4 I7
4 IS o 17
2 I5 4 I7
3 I4 o 17
8
4’
6
3
Thue candidates from patty, in constituency
i 28 26 37 6 65 32
2 25 I6 4° I3 65 29
3 2o I5 45 6 : ’65 2i
Two candidates from party in onstituen~
x 9 6 25 6 34 x2
2 x2 II 22 2 34 I3
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the ballot paper that are significant for the 1969 data are first rank in party,
X1, for non-incumbents (significant at the IO per cent confidence level) and
first place on the ballot, Xs, for incumbents (significant at the 5 per cent level).
The estimated coefficient of X1 for non-incumbents is lower than that obtained
for the 1973 data (591 compared with 968) but the coefficient for first place
on ballot among incumbents is very large (136o
, 
compared with only 281 for
the 1973 data). Where the coefficients of the other variables included in these
equations are significant, they broadly agree with those estimated for the 1973
data, but fewer of them are significant. The contrast with the 1969 results is
most evident among non-incumbent candidates. It is possible to speculate
that the larger number of non-incumbents may have led to fewer voters being
influenced by position on the ballot paper in choosing between candidates
within a party.
We believe that the findings of this brief analysis of the 1969 Election provide
some further support for our general hypothesis that position on ballot in-
fluences the first preference and transfer votes obtained by candidates in Irish
elections. But this investigation also suggests that these factors have operated
in varying degree in different elections. This much was already evident from
Table 2 and our survey of the historical background. Much further research
could be done on the historical data in the hope of pinpointing the conditions
under which alphabetical voting has been most important in Irish elections.
~.’,~ , ¯ :
~ ~ . ’_,-’,i.¸ , - ~’:-:~,~: ,,
!-, ’ ~: :! ¯ ~" "~i ,~’, ~’ ~i, : ,~i.~’~. ~ "~’~ !:, i’~:.’,~’~,i’~,: i:~’~’~’~.iV~,~~ : ’~ :.’I ,, /,
"~1[’~ rE believe that this paper has estabhshed the following main poin{s.
~i. The alphabe’fical disffibution ’6f"stiriiar/ies ’among’ the T.n.s elec’ted ;tO’
D~lil ]~ireann in ’the 1’973. Geiieral Electi0n is’ "mark’edl~;’ biased in comparison
with ’that 0fa random sample 0fth~t~ish popul.kti6nl ThiS~biasis most evident
in the .0verrei~i~es~ntatibfi of Iiames begirinifig’ Witll A~’B~ai~fl-C~. which a~coii~t
for: 33 per cent ofthe’ T.D~s’, ’bu’t 0nly~ 20’ per~ cent ofthe ~popiilation. On t~e
other hand, the M, N, O group is conspicuously, underrepreseilted"amo[ng
T.D.s;. accounting, f0# only’ 151per ceilt of their names, cefiapar~d With~5 "per
Cent ’of the’ generM pepulktion2 ~If’the T.D.swere~distribiiteCi exactiy~ as’ the
Irish’ p0iSfllatiqn’ therewofild~ be ~’ fewer ’dei~utioS":With~’A~G; surnames2. ’ ’; ~
" ~." A similar: bias :is ievident amoii~ tke n;ames: of tl~e~ ilncufiibent candidate~
who stood in~’th6 General; Electi0n,~ bfit the names of the"’fion~incumbent
candid~te~ w~re distHbuted sigiilarl
~’ 
t0 those:of the’ ge’n!eral populatibn.~ i ,, ,
3. The principal mechanism operating to produce this distortion is the
advantage a candidate enjoys if he is alphabetically first among the candidates
from his party in a constituency. It appears that a significant proportion of
voters vote "the party ticket" by giving their first two or threepreferences to
the party’s candidates in the order inwhich they appear on the ballot.
The average first preference vote received in the 1973 Elections by first~
ranked non-incumbents in constituencies where their party ran three candidates
was 1,46~ higher than that received by those in second rank. We estimate that¯
the net effect of being alphabetically first in this situation, after alloWing for
the infuence of Other relevant factors, is to increase the candidate’s first
preference vote by 968 (the standard error of this estimate is 333).
4. There is also evidence that voters are influenced by candidates’ overall
position on the ballot (as distinct from position relative to other members of
the same party). In particular, being in the last position on the ballot appears
to bestow some advantage on a candidate, and this partially offsets the dis-
advantage of being last among the candidates put forward by the party. The
evidence suggests that Fine Gael and the Labour Party obtained a significantly
higher share of the valid poll in constituencies where they had a candidate in
last place on the ballot.
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5. These effects (namely, 3 and 4 above) have been shown to operate with
greater force on non-incumbents than on incumbents. It has also been seen
that the level of statistical significance attached to these effects is much higher
among non-incumbents. Thus "thee VOtlng~.patterns discussed in this paper
derive their main importance from their implications for the electoral prospects
of candidates :who are. hot. members ’of.thei outgoing D~iil..             ’
6. Itl was :seen that incumbents’ were,relatiVely .fav0urably placed on the
b~tllot papers compared with hon-incumbents, being.~in, particular far more
likely ~to rank first among their, party’S candidates in’ a constituency. The
disadvantages ass6ciated with’a middle or low position on the ~ballot paper
thus not onlyhave a greater impact on non-incumbents than: on. incumbents,
but non-incumbeflts ,are also considerably more,likely, to" experience these
disadvantages~ ~ .... . : ¯ ’" : -: .
¯
~ !’    , ..... ¯ ~"~ ’:’’ ~ i,
7. Once a voter has decided on his’ ¯first preferences,vote, he. appears to be
strongly influenced, in the’ allocation of iower preferencesbythe position on the
ballot of the remaining cahdida~es from the’ party,:of:the candidate who re-
ceived.his first,preference. This facto~ favours candidates in: the middle of three
in obtaining transfers, by,virtue :of: their proximity to both the first-and last-
ranked candidates of their party.’~ ’    : ’: .... ~’ .,,i i,., :-~
¯ ’ 8. The voting -patterns described above appear to have. been .important in
many. of the Electiofls sinceth’e~ introduction’of Pr61~ortiona! Representation
with alphabetically arranged ballots in Ireland.~ The!result~ is a-much greater
distortion in the alphabetical distribution of T.D.S’ names than can be ac-
counted for by the voting patternsin a single election. This is reflected in the
distortion Of incumbent candidate’s’ names .notedat 2,~ above.,
9. A study of the I969 General Election returns provided evidence of the
operation of voting patterns similar to some of those revealed in the i973 data.
Conclusion
-    , , , -
If the analysis put forward in this paper is accepted, and if it is generallyagreed that alphabetical influences on voting behaviour are undesirable, the
remedial action is obvious. Reform could be achieved in two stages. The first
stage would be :to randomise the order in which names appear on the ballot
paper in each constituency. No serious practical or administrative obstacle
seems to stand in the way of this proposal. If implemented, it would~ over a
series of elections, remove the cumulative effects of the advantage currently
enjoyed by candidates with names beginning with an early letter of.the al-
phabet. This change would, according to our analysis, make itself felt most
clearly among non-incumbents, thereby removing an arbitrary distortion
from the election prospects of new candidates.
The reform of randomising the ballot would not, hOWever, eliminate the
advantage enjoyed by candidates who do well in the draw for position on.the
ballot in any one election. To obviate this problem a second reform would :be
required, such as the use of a ’!rotating. ballot". This is a procedure under
which the order of the candidates (first decided by a random draw)is rotated
at regular intervals during the printing of a ballot, so that if for example there
are 1o candidates in a.constituency each candidate would headthe ballot on
one tenth of the papers. This system was used in New .York City¯ elections,¯ from
x937’to I947,~ and. similar schemes are [common ¯practice in market Surveys
and social research.generally.                , ¯ .          ¯’
Obviously these proposals would complicate matters at both the printing
and counting stages of an election, but their cost would be slightin relation
to the total cost of a General Election.
-
., , . .... ¯
¯    , ,.
2sCf. I.,akeman, op. cit., p. x5o and p. 261.
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